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DLD-344        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2384 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  THOMAS PAUL RICHARD, SR., 
 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-00016) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
July 18, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 31, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Thomas Richard, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus requesting that we 1) compel the Magistrate Judge to recuse himself and 2) 
reverse the denial of his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  
 We will issue a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) only in 
“extraordinary circumstances.”  See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 
(3d Cir. 1996).  A petitioner seeking mandamus must show that (1) no other adequate 
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means exist to attain the desired relief, (2) his right to issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances of his case.  Cheney 
v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 
383, 399 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Given its drastic nature, a writ of mandamus should not be 
issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary appeal.”  Hahnemann, 74 F.3d 
at 461; see also Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 398 (holding mandamus is not a substitute 
for appeal).  Even when these elements are met, the decision to issue a writ of mandamus 
is “largely discretionary.”  Hahnemann, 74 F.3d at 461.       
  The Magistrate Judge denied Richard’s 60(b) motion as moot.  Denial of a motion 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is a final, appealable order.  See, e.g., Pridgen v. 
Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because an ordinary appeal is available, we 
will deny the petition for mandamus to the extent it is an attempt to seek review of the 
District Court’s order.  See United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding power for appellate courts to issue mandamus is limited to “exceptional cases 
where the traditional bases for jurisdiction do not apply.”) (quoting In re Pasquariello, 16 
F.3d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
 However, mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion 
to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 777-78 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Richard’s assertion of bias is solely on the basis that the Magistrate Judge 
has ruled against him in the past.  That is insufficient to establish that the Magistrate 
Judge’s partiality might reasonably be questioned within the meaning of § 455.  Liteky v. 
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United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute 
a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).  Here, the record only shows that the 
Magistrate Judge denied Richard’s petition for writ of habeas corpus five years ago, and 
Richard has pointed to no extrajudicial source of bias.  See United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir. 1994).  We find no evidence in the record of a “deep seated or 
high degree of favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”  
United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
 
